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a b s t r a c t
Land tenure security is widely considered to be a fundamental factor in motivating farmers to adopt
sustainable land management practices. This study aims to establish whether it is true that owner-
operators adopt more effective soil conservation measures than tenant-operators, and whether well-
designed agro-environmental instruments can provide sufﬁciently strong motivation to compensate for
the differences between these two groups.
An analysis of the level of adoption of four types of erosion control measures on 263 blocks of arable
land endangered by water erosion in the Czech Republic has proved that all measures were adopted
by owners signiﬁcantly more frequently than by tenants. Compared to tenants, owners applied wide-
row crops in crop rotation schemes 2.4 times less frequently in the last 5 years, while they applied
soil-improving crops 1.9 times more frequently. Contour farming was adopted 1.8 times more often by
owners, and the slope length in production blocks farmed by owners was on an average 2.4 times shorter
than in blocks farmed by tenants. However, the study has also shown that, in cases where conservation
measures are supported by incentives based on Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAEC)
standards cross compliance, the differences in the approach to soil conservation between owners and
tenants were minimized or eliminated, due to the adoption of responsible practices by tenants. The
study has proved that a well-designed system of environmentally determined subsidies can compensate
otherwise substantial differences in the attitude of owners and tenants towards soil conservation.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. Introduction
Thewell-known saying “No onewashes a rented car”, attributed
o several different authors, encapsulates the basic idea investi-
ated in this study. As long as there are countries where farmland
s operated mostly by tenants (e.g. 11 of the 28 EU countries), it is
mportant to ask whether the tenants take responsible care of this
atural resource. In the spirit of the above saying, a negative answer
an be presumed. However, this answer needs to be veriﬁed on the
asis of real data. We should know whether differences do exist
etween owners’ and tenants’ farming practices, and, if so, how sig-
iﬁcant these differences are. We should also know how farmers’
ecisions are affected by motivational tools, such as the European
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GAECcross-compliance standards,which support sustainableman-
agement practices on farmland. Are well designed subsidy policies
able to compensate the differences between owners and tenants?
Soil erosion as a physical process has been consistently studied
for the last two centuries (Dotterweich, 2013) by scientists from
backgrounds as diverse as geography, agronomy and engineer-
ing (Boardman et al., 2003). However, the causes of this physical
process are ﬁrmly rooted in the socio-economic, political and cul-
tural environment in which the land users operate (Stocking and
Murnaghan, 2001), which is a fact not taken into account in the
majority of soil erosion studies (Boardman, 2006).
Farmers’ decisions to employ practices leading to soil conser-
vation, rather than to soil degradation, can be divided into three
categories according to their motivation: farmers’ voluntary deci-
sions based on their values, decisions motivated by economic
incentives, and decisions determined by legal restrictions. In tradi-
tional agricultural societies, voluntary soil conservationwas thekey
to long-term survival, and episodes of increased soil degradation
generally marked a signiﬁcant setback to the human population
(e.g. Pregill and Volkman, 1999). In some parts of the world, such
as the Mediterranean uplands (McNeill, 2002), this effect was less
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ronounced as the soils are degraded more slowly. In other places,
otably the tropics, soil degradation tends to be much faster, lead-
ng to an immediate and dramatic effect on agricultural yields.
herefore, unless sustainable alternatives were found, the pop-
lations quickly ceased to grow (Henley, 2008). In the Central
uropean region, farming within traditional small-scale ﬁeld pat-
erns (Sklenicka et al., 2009; Skalosˇ et al., 2012) was relatively
ffective in soil conservation (Kovárˇ et al., 2011).
In the present day, a number of methods are available to
ncrease short-term agricultural production, regardless of possible
ong-term effects on the soil quality. The decision to employ soil
onserving practices, at the expense of immediate ﬁnancial gain, is
herefore a complex one, inﬂuenced by a number of factors. Some
uthors (e.g. Löw and Míchal, 2003) argue that “ties to the land”
re critical in the farmer’s decision to protect the soil, and that
and which has been owned and farmed by a family for several
enerations is much more likely to receive long-term erosion con-
rol measures. Similarly, Stocking and Murnaghan (2001) note that
ecurity of land tenure affects farmers’ decisions in a similar way,
nd Hardin (1968) discusses the “tragedy of the commons”, point-
ng out that common property resources are the most vulnerable
o degradation. Ervin (1982) has also demonstrated better use of
oil conservation practices by owner operators than by tenants. On
he other hand, Boardman et al. (2003) state that in the developed
orld, there is no evidence that owners conserve soil better than
enants. They hypothesize that this could be due to the high level
f land tenure security for tenants.
Stocking and Murnaghan (2001) also emphasize the role of the
ocation of impacts of soil conservation measures. Practices which
ncur beneﬁts or eliminate costs on-site (on the farmer’s land) are
uch more likely to be employed voluntarily than those with an
mpact that occurs off-site (McConnell, 1983). For example, silting
f rivers and water bodies, and also mud ﬂoods, are perceived as a
ost to society, not to the individual farmer (Schuler et al., 2006),
nd are therefore less likely to be mitigated voluntarily by farmers.
Off-site impacts are therefore often the primary concern of pre-
ention and mitigation measures employed by governments and
onservation agencies (Evans, 2002; Fullen et al., 2006; Kutter
t al., 2011). These include (1)mandatorymeasures,which regulate
nvironmental damage using reinforcement mechanisms such as
nes or withdrawal of farming subsidies; (2) voluntary incentive-
ased measures, which provide ﬁnancial incentives to provide
nvironmental beneﬁts beyond the level established bymandatory
easures; and (3) awareness-raising measures, aiming to edu-
ate land users in best management practices (Kutter et al., 2011).
requently, a combination of these approaches is used to achieve
ptimal results (Anderson and Thampapillai, 1990). It also needs to
e noted that schemes which are formally based on incentives can
n some cases have restrictive aspects. For example, 40% of farmers
ho participated in the ﬁrst stage of the Sloping Land Conversion
rogram in China felt that their participationwas imposed on them
y the authorities (Wang and Maclaren, 2012).
In the EU, incentive-based measures have a long tradition, and
verviews by Boardman et al. (2003) and Fullen et al. (2006) report
ostly measures of this type. Boardman et al. (2003) state that
armers in the developed world are predominantly inﬂuenced by
conomic incentives, and Myers and Kent (1998) note that the
xtent of this inﬂuence has in some cases contributed to environ-
ental degradation.
Voluntary incentive-based measures often form parts of
egional development policies. These policies have formed a basis
or many cases of conservation success in Europe, including a sub-
tantial reduction in soil erosion due to a change from autumn
o spring ploughing in Norway (Lundekvam et al., 2003), mit-
gation of harmful sheep grazing practices in Iceland (Arnalds
nd Barkarson, 2003), and greater farmer involvement in soillicy 47 (2015) 253–261
conservation schemes in Belgium (Verstraeten et al., 2003) and
the Netherlands (Spaan et al., 2010). In recent years, a large pro-
portion of soil conservation incentives have been paid within
the EU Agri-environmental programmes and as Natural Handicap
payments to farmers in less favoured areas (Kutter et al., 2011).
Although the acceptance of these programmes is often ambigu-
ous (Macilwain, 2004), measures facilitated by the incentives have
already contributed signiﬁcantly to soil conservation in the EU (e.g.
Van Rompaey et al., 2001; Schuler and Sattler, 2010).
Mandatory soil conservation measures have traditionally been
embodied in the legal systems of the individual EU countries, and
there was a high level of spatio-temporal variability in the 20th
century. For example, while Western European countries such as
Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark have fewer but more
stable mandatory soil conservation regulations (Boardman and
Poesen, 2006), post-communist countries such as the CzechRepub-
lic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary experienced a rapid change
from heavily regulated to almost unregulated land management in
the1990s (Dostál et al., 2006;Cebecauer andHoﬁerka, 2008).While
the mandatory measures implemented under communist regimes
were production-oriented rather than conservation-oriented, and
had many negative impacts on soils and on the landscape, rapid
deregulation without adequate replacement also contributed to
soil degradation in many places (Janecˇek et al., 2002).
In 2005, the EU Common Agricultural Policy was supplemented
by mandatory cross-compliance standards to prevent negative
environmental impacts of agriculture. The issue of water soil
erosion is addressed mainly by the Good Agricultural and Envi-
ronmental Conditions standards GAEC 1 and GAEC 2, applied to
agricultural parcels listed in the Land Parcel Identiﬁcation System
as arable land. The following summary lists the conditions of GAEC
1 and GAEC 2 valid in the Czech Republic and relevant for the pur-
poses of this study.
GAEC 1 deﬁnes soil conservation measures on arable parcels
with a slope greater than 7◦. Applicants for farming subsidies on
this type of land are required to sow a subsequent crop after har-
vest or to apply one of the following measures: (1) The stubble
of the harvested crop is left on the block of land or part thereof
at least until November 30th, unless this is contrary to GAEC 2
requirements on plots strongly endangered by erosion. (2) The land
remains ploughed or tilled for the purposes of water absorption at
least untilNovember30th, unless this is contrary toGAEC2 require-
ments onplots strongly endangeredby erosion. Thesemeasures are
minimum requirements leading to a reduction in soil erosion and
runoff, aswell as to a decreased risk of ﬂooding and related damage.
The main aims of GAEC 2 are to protect soil against water ero-
sion and to reduce both direct impacts of erosion and indirect
impacts caused by ﬂooding and muddy ﬂoods. The GAEC 2 stan-
dard addressing the issue of erosion on strongly endangered soils
was accepted on January 1st 2010, and since July 1st 2011 the stan-
dard has been extended to slightly endangered soils. The issue of
soil erosion is addressed by regulating the crop species grown on
vulnerable land and the agrotechnology that may be used.
Applicants for farming subsidies (direct payments within Pil-
lar 1) on land classiﬁed as strongly endangered by erosion are
required through cross-compliance not to grow wide-row crops
on this land, i.e. maize, potatoes, beetroot, broad beans, soy, sun-
ﬂower and sorghum. Cereals and rape seed crops are to be planted
using soil protective technologies. For cereal crops, these measures
are not required where the crop is sown into protective clover or
grass-clover undersow. On slightly endangered soils, the applicant
is required to grow wide-row crops only with soil protective tech-
nologies. These conditions do not need to be met where the area
of endangered soil is less than 0.40ha, provided that the wide-
row crops rows are oriented along contour lines, with maximum
divergence of 30◦, and that below the endangered area there is
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n adjacent belt of agricultural land at least 24m in width, which
nterrupts all drain lines intersecting the endangered area with
ide-row crops. On this belt, the applicant is required to establish
rassland, perennial fodder crops or other cropswith the exception
f wide-row crops.
The goal of this study is to answer two fundamental questions:
1) Do land-owning farmers treat their own property more respon-
ibly than tenant farmers? (2) Do agri-environmental instruments
hat support sustainable farming practices (in our case, GAEC) pro-
ide sufﬁciently strong motivation to compensate any differences
etween owners and tenants?
. Material and methods
.1. Data collection
The basic spatial unit, to which all variables are related, is a pro-
uction block registered in the Land Parcel Identiﬁcation System
LPIS). The 263 production blocks used in this study were chosen
y stratiﬁed randomselectionwithin theCzechRepublic. The selec-
ion includes only blocks which are endangered by water erosion
nd are in the Slightly Endangered or Strongly Endangered cate-
ories, according to the GAEC typology. The primary classiﬁcation
nto these categories within LPIS was performed using the USLE
ethod with modiﬁed C and P factors (Wischmeier and Smith,
978) by the Research Institute for Soil and Water Conservation in
rague for the Ministry of Agriculture. The stratiﬁcation of random
election consisted of applying predetermined criteria to provide
qual representation for each of the country’s 13 administrative
nits (the Prague Capital Region is excluded from our study, as the
roportion of farmland in this region is negligible), for both types
f land users (owners and tenants), for various size categories of
arms, and also for the ﬁve growing regions that occur in the Czech
epublic, based mainly on climatic and soil conditions.
In order to avoid data sets of spatially correlated data, the min-
mum distance between two nearest blocks was set to 5km. This
lso guarantees that no more than 1 block is situated in any munic-
pality. Other types of erosion risks are not considered in this study,
s they are only a marginal cause of land degradation in the Czech
epublic.
The explained variables indicate four ways in which a farmer
an affect erosion control of arable soil (Table 1). Two of these vari-
bles reﬂect the inclusion or exclusion of crops relevant for soil
rosion in crop rotation within a 5-year period, i.e. on the one
and wide-row crops (WIDEROW) that increase soil loss, includ-
ngmaize (Zeamays), potatoes (Solanum tuberosum), beetroot (Beta
ulgaris) and sunﬂower (Helianthus annuus), and on the other hand
oil-improving crops (IMPROVE), which have a positive impact in
his sense, and among which we have included clovers (Trifolium
pp.), alfalfa (Medicago sativa), hairy vetch (Vicia villosa), Hungar-
an vetch (Vicia pannonica), common vetch (Vicia sativa), blue lupin
Lupinus angustifolius) and pea (Pisum sativum). The values for these
wo variables were established based on personal interviews with
armers. Each of the crops listed above was recorded as “used” if it
as included in the crop rotation as a main crop or as a catch crop,
s deﬁnedbyGAEC, on the respective productionblock at least once
n the years 2009–2013.
The next two explained variables express the farmer’s choice to
nterrupt the runoff strip lengthon the slopeof theproductionblock
sing agrotechnical, technical or combined measures (slope length
f production block – LENGTH, m), and to reduce water erosion
y contour farming (CONTOUR). Contour farming involves prepar-
ng the land, planting, and cultivating a crop along the contours of
ﬁeld to reduce erosion, increase water inﬁltration, and control
unoff water. The values of both of the variables were derived fromlicy 47 (2015) 253–261 255
a combination of a digital elevation model (Fundamental Base of
Geographic Data of the Czech Republic on scale of 1:10,000) and
orthophotographs. The lines of the uninterrupted slope were cre-
ated and measured to obtain LENGTH values for each production
block. Contour farming was recorded where in at least 75% of the
area of the block arable land was cultivated along contour lines,
with maximum divergence of 30◦.
Theexplainedvariableswere tested for theeffects of twopredic-
tors. The ﬁrst was Character of Farming Subject (FARMING), which
indicates whether the farming subject is himself the owner of the
farmed blocks, or whether the subject is a tenant. To determine
whether a block is farmed by the owner or by a tenant, we com-
pared the data from LPIS with data from the Land Register. Cases
where these two alternatives are combined, and where one pro-
duction block includes both parcels owned by and parcels rented
by the farming subject were omitted. The second predictor, taken
from the LPIS database, expressed the slope of the production block
(ANGLE,◦) classiﬁed into two categories, as slopes up to 7◦ and
slopes above 7◦. This division reﬂects the GAEC erosion control
standards. In slopes up to 7◦, only GAEC 2 erosion control stan-
dards are relevant, whereas in slopes above 7◦ both GAEC 1 and
GAEC 2 principles are applied. The version of GAEC 1 and GAEC 2
valid in 2009–2013 has been used in this study.
2.2. Statistical data processing
For eachof the tested farming approaches (response of the farm-
ers) we analyzed a separate model, in which we were particularly
interested in the effect of interaction (stated as the third term in
the model) between two ﬁxed predictors, farming subject (owner
versus tenant) and Mean Slope Angle of Production Block (≤7◦
or >7◦), suggesting that there may be different trends in farming
approaches on steep slopes versus moderate slopes between own-
ers and tenants. In the analysis of farming approaches, including
applications of wide-row crops, soil-improving crops and contour
farming, we used generalized linear models with a binomial dis-
tribution of the response variables (GLMbinom). We analyzed the
effects of predictors on the slope length of the production block
using a general linear model with a log transformed explained
variable to approach its normality (GLMgaussian). The models were
performed in R release 3.0.3 (R Development Core Team, 2010).
P=0.05 was adopted as the level of statistical signiﬁcance.
Because disproportions in block sizes and numbers of blocks
with steep slopes between owners and tenants might cause the
results to be misinterpreted, we ﬁrst checked the differences in
block sizes and the proportion of blocks with steep slopes between
owners and tenants. All values (results) are presented as mean+SE
(standard errors) unless stated otherwise.
3. Results
We found highly signiﬁcant differences in mean block size
between owners and tenants (66.4±23.7ha and 148.4±45.1ha,
respectively, t test: t=4.60, df = 261, P<0.0001), while the propor-
tion of blocks with steep slopes did not differ signiﬁcantly between
owners and tenants (Fisher’s Exact Test,P=0.07).We therefore con-
trolled the effect of predictors for block size in themodels (i.e. block
sizewas included as ﬁrst in themodels and is not further presented
in the results).
The single predictor FARMING was signiﬁcant in all four tested
models (Table 2). As shown in Fig. 1, there were substantial dif-
ferences in the behaviour of owners and tenants in all cases. The
results show that while in the last 5 years owners had included
wide-rowcrops (WIDEROW) in crop rotation schemeson just 23.6%
of the production blocks, tenants had included these crops in 52.1%
256 P. Sklenicka et al. / Land Use Policy 47 (2015) 253–261
Table 1
Description of the variables used in the study.
Variables Abbr. Data type Data source Standards of GAEC
Explanatory variables
Farming subject FARMING Owner/tenant LPIS; Land Register
Mean Slope Angle of Production Block ANGLE ≤7◦/>7◦ DEM; LPIS
Explained variables
Wide-row crops in crop rotation WIDEROW Yes/no Survey with farmers Yes, in slopes >7◦
Soil-improving crops in crop rotation IMPROVE Yes/no Survey with farmers Yes, in slopes >7◦
]
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mSlope length of production block LENGTH Total slope length [m
Contour farming CONTOUR Cultivation followin
f cases. On the other hand, soil improving crops (IMPROVE) were
ncluded by owners on as many as 69.9% of the blocks, whereas
enants used them in just 37.4% of cases. Contour farming (CON-
OUR) was applied as a soil conservation measure by owners on
8.3% of the blocks, whereas tenants applied this measure on just
6.8% of the blocks. The uninterrupted slope length (LENGTH) was
mean± std. deviation) 113±69m on blocks farmed by owners,
hile on blocks farmed by tenants the uninterrupted slope length
as on an average 2.4 times longer (275±253m).
The second predictor – ANGLE – was signiﬁcant for two
xplained variables (Table 2), both describing the use of crops rel-
vant for soil conservation in crop rotation schemes in the last 5
ears. Wide-row crops (WIDEROW) were used on slopes up to 7◦
n 59.5% of production blocks, whereas on slopes over 7◦ theywere
sed in 21.9% of cases. On the other hand, soil improving crops
ig. 1. Signiﬁcant differences (P<0.0001) in the adoption of four tested soil conservation
locks of arable land (a) wide-row crops, (b) soil improving crops, (c) contour farming, an
easures signiﬁcantly more responsibly.DEM; LPIS No
our lines±30◦ yes/no DEM; LPIS; orthophotographs No
(IMPROVE) were grown on 24.3% of blocks on slopes up to 7◦ and
on 73.7% of blocks on slopes above 7◦.
The interactions of the two tested predictors (Farming:Angle)
were highly signiﬁcant only for one explained variable –
WIDEROW. In addition, in the case of IMPROVE the effect of the
interaction was marginally non-signiﬁcant (p=0.062; Table 2). The
results show that on slopes up to 7◦, tenants used wide-row crops
(WIDEROW) in 71.9% of the production blocks, whereas own-
ers used these crops in just 23.5% of cases. On slopes above 7◦,
the proportion of blocks where wide-row crops were grown was
approximately the same for both groups (tenants =22.7%; own-
ers =23.7%; Fig. 2).
On slopes up to 7◦, tenants only used soil improving crops
(IMPROVE, Fig. 3) on 14.9% of the blocks, whereas owners applied
these crops 3.8 times more often (on 55.9% of the production
measures between owner-operators and tenant-operators on all tested production
d (d) slope length. In all four cases, owner-operators appear to adopt conservation
P. Sklenicka et al. / Land Use Po
Table 2
Results of models analyzing the effects of farming subject (FARMING), Mean Slope
Angle of Production Block (ANGLE) and their interaction on (A) wide-row crops in
crop rotation (WIDEROW), (B) soil-improving crops in crop rotation (IMPROVE), (C)
slope length of production block (LENGTH), and (D) contour farming (CONTOUR).
The overdispersion in binomial models was 1.14 (model A), 1.03 (model B), 1.18
(model D).
Factor Estimate SE 2 Df P
A. WIDEROW
Farming −2.07 0.459 15.19 1 <0.0001
Angle −2.18 0.347 34.83 1 <0.0001
Farming:Angle 2.22 0.655 11.34 1 0.0008
B. IMPROVE
Farming 1.84 0.435 17.68 1 <0.0001
Angle 2.57 0.364 63.13 1 <0.0001
Farming:Angle −1.24 0.650 3.49 1 0.062
C. CONTOUR
Farming 1.90 0.429 45.96 1 <0.0001
Angle 0.32 0.335 1.99 1 0.158
Farming:Angle 0.26 0.620 0.18 1 0.675
D. LENGTH
Farming −0.35 0.079 4.07 1 <0.0001
Angle −0.13 0.060 0.48 1 0.086
Farming:Angle 0.14 0.011 0.27 1 0.199
Fig. 2. The representation of wide-row crops in crop rotation schemes by owners
and farmers in the last 5 years, presented separately for blocks on slopes below 7◦
and above 7◦ . The graph distinctly shows that the differences between owners and
tenants that are signiﬁcant on slopes below 7◦ are not evident on slopes above 7◦ ,
where the less frequent use of wide-row crops is due to subsidy payments.
Fig. 3. The representation of soil-improving crops in crop rotation schemes by own-
ers and tenants in the last 5 years, presented separately for blocks on slopes below
7◦ and above 7◦ . The graph distinctly shows that the signiﬁcant differences between
owners and tenants on slopes below 7◦ are not evident on slopes above 7◦ , where
the more frequent use of soil-improving crops is due to subsidy payments.licy 47 (2015) 253–261 257
blocks). On slopes above 7◦, this difference was substantially
smaller, with tenants using soil improving crops on 70.7% of the
production blocks and owners in 82.0% of cases.
4. Discussion
Private ownership implies not only rights and freedoms, but
also the owner’s responsibilities in the management of the prop-
erty, which transfer the decision-making to the lowest level, i.e. to
the individual (farm). The owner’s rights to enjoy the beneﬁts of
their investments create incentives towards effective utilization of
the resources (Bechmann et al., 2008). However, the freedom to
use property may be delegated by rent or lease contracts. In these
contracts, the residual rights are maintained by the initial owner.
Skogh (2000) considers these residual rights to be the essence of
ownership. However, the concept of ownership itself always has to
be understood in the context of an individual country and culture.
Unlike in Europe, where ownership means a practically absolute
right to dispose of the land freely, including unlimited land sale
rights, in a number of African countries land cannot be sold out-
side of the community, and it therefore has no commercial value
(Hesseling, 1998).
It is evident that the more rights and freedom the owner con-
tractually delegates to the tenant, the fewer rights and the less
freedom he retains. In the context of our study, it is not only the
owner’s right to beneﬁts that are important, but above all his right
to protect his property. These two rights, however, are often in con-
tradiction. Not only the owner but also the tenant of the land is
motivated by proﬁt. However, the owner’s motivation, unlike the
tenant’s, lies not only in the instantaneous yield of the land, but
also in the value of the land as such, in maintaining and increasing
this value for the beneﬁt of his successors, or in order to gain a bet-
ter price when the land is sold (McConnell, 1983). However, this
value, which is a long-term attribute, can be reduced by the ten-
ants in order to gain maximum short-term proﬁt for themselves.
The long-term (permanent) value of the land is protected not only
by the contract between the tenant and the owner of the land, but
also by a number of legislative, motivational, and also cultural and
ethical measures, which the community (state) employs to protect
its natural resources, on the one hand, and the tenure rights on the
other hand. Moreover, the owner can motivate the tenant to make
long-term investments in soil conservation by increasing tenure
security (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003).
A number of studies have shown that insecure land tenure,
caused mainly by short-term lease contracts, does not contribute
to soil conservation (e.g. Nowak and Korsching, 1983; Soule et al.,
2000; Fraser, 2004). Economic theories predict that enhancing
tenure security should invite investments in erosion control and
soil quality (Beekman and Bulte, 2012). Soil degradation occurs pri-
marily where farmers perceive the land only as an economic asset
(Assies, 2009).
4.1. Is the owner more responsible than a tenant?
In our study, we have selected four types of erosion control
measures that can be employed by the farming subject (owner or
tenant) to control the amount of runoff from the land. Two of these
measures (wide-row crops and soil-improving crops), are required
by cross-complianceunder theGAEC standards in theCzechRepub-
lic. The remaining twomeasures (slope lengthandcontour farming)
are not directly mentioned in the GAEC standards. It is therefore up
to the farming subject to decidewhether to implement them. It can
generally be said that all four types of measures tested in our study
were adopted in a signiﬁcantly more responsible way by owners
than by tenants.
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Wide-row crops were used in crop rotation systems on land
ndangered by erosion once or more times in the last 5 years
.4 times more often on blocks farmed by tenants than on blocks
armed by owners. This occurred in spite of the fact that coverman-
gement is one of the measures that can be most easily adopted
o reduce erosion (Renard et al., 1991). The responsible approach,
ccording towhichwide-row crops should be eliminated or at least
inimized on blocks endangered by erosion, as these crops pro-
ide minimum cover to the topsoil, is in practice confronted by
he economic interests of the farming subject (Fraser, 2004). Wide-
ow crops, in the Czech Republic mainly maize, are economically
nteresting crops, especially because in the present day they are
rown not only for direct consumption or as fodder for cattle, but
lso used for biogas production and for other technical products.
ntirely excluding these crops from the crop rotation system can
herefore mean a signiﬁcant economic sacriﬁce for the farmer.
Crops improving the soil against erosion provide relatively
table vegetation cover, protecting the soil from the impact of
aindrops. At the same time, these crops improve the quality of
he soil, making it more fertile and less prone to erosion. On
he blocks tested in this study, soil-improving crops were used
n crop rotation systems at least once in 5 years 1.9 times more
ften by owners than by tenants. To put it simply, we can state
hat, in our study, the exclusion of wide-row crops represents the
armer’s desire not to contribute to soil degradation, while the use
f soil-improving crops indicates a desire to improve the current
tate of the soil. Soil-improving crops are essentially a medium- to
ong-term investment in soil quality, rather than an economically
ttractive commodity bringing immediate proﬁt. Soil-improving
rops are therefore grown mostly by owners, who take the long-
erm perspective of the condition and fertility of the soil into
onsideration in view of their commitment to their own property.
or tenants, theperspectivemaybe limited to the lengthof the lease
ontractwith the landowner, and it is thereforenot lucrative for the
enant to “invest” in improving soil fertility at the expense of imme-
iate proﬁt. Farmers who engage in long-term soil conservation in
his sense may sacriﬁce immediate income for the promise of bet-
er soil fertility and conservation (Fraser, 2004). However, tenants
ften lack security that they will be able to beneﬁt from advan-
ages brought by long-term investments, so they are motivated
ather to maximize short-term production, often at the expense
f deteriorating soil conservation and loss in soil fertility. These
onclusions are conﬁrmed by studies from countries all over the
orld, with various legal and political systems (e.g. Nowak and
orsching, 1983; Gillis et al., 1992; Hu, 1997; Praneetvatakul et al.,
001). In this sense, our results conﬁrmtheseﬁndings that compare
wner-operated and tenant-farmed arable land.
Similarly, contour farming as a soil conservation measure
roved to be signiﬁcantly (1.8 times)more likely to be used onplots
armedbyowners thanonplots farmedby tenants. Thisﬁnding is all
hemore interesting because the tenants in our study farmed on an
verage larger ﬁelds than owners, while according to Lichtenberg
2004) plot size is a signiﬁcant factor positively determining the
pplication of this erosion control measures. However, our results
ndicate that, in this case, land ownership is a far stronger motiva-
ion than the additional costs associated with the implementation
f this measure, which can however bring a number of beneﬁts,
uch as more effective water management, reduction of nutrient
osses and consequent higher yields of agricultural crops (Quinton
nd Catt, 2004).
Finally, the results concerning the fourth tested type of mea-
ures – slope length – also indicatemore responsible use of the land
y owners. Blocks of arable land farmed by owners had 2.4 times
horter slope length than those farmed by tenants, while, notably,
any studies found soil loss to be positively associated with slope
ength (e.g. Megahan et al., 2001; Xu et al., 2009), and the samelicy 47 (2015) 253–261
relationship is conﬁrmedby thewidely usedUSLE cropland erosion
predictionmodel (WischmeierandSmith, 1978)and its revisedver-
sionRUSLE (Renard et al., 1991). Shorter slope lengthusuallymeans
higher soil cultivation costs, as it involves more frequent turning
of the tillage machinery on headlands, resulting in a higher pro-
portion of non-working rides across the farmland (Gonzalez et al.,
2004). The application of this measure therefore requires motiva-
tion strong enough to exceed the increased costs. In our case, this
motivation is created by ownership, but not by the less secure land
tenancy.
Some authors argue whether long leases provide the same
incentives as land ownership to conserve the soil. Their works
illustrate the crucial signiﬁcance of the political, economic and
legislative background of the individual countries in which these
studies were performed. A certain role is also played by social
norms, as is illustrated in a study by Beekman and Bulte (2012).
While in many developing countries long-term lease of farm-
land often matches the security of ownership (Gebremedhin and
Swinton, 2003;Ndahetal., 2014), or evenexceeds it in somecharac-
teristics, such as resistance to urbandevelopment (Lee and Stewart,
1983), in countries with a developed free market, ownership is
the form of land tenure that is most likely to guarantee long-term
investments in soil quality. Some studies draw similar conclu-
sions on house ownership, e.g. Buchanan (2012) states that owners
are more responsible than renters, creating more stable neigh-
bourhoods. In this sense Lumley (1997) and Walters et al. (1999)
emphasis the signiﬁcance of the “desire to own land” phenomenon
as a motivation of owners towards long-term investments.
Our study regards ownership in the context of the Czech Repub-
lic as a more secure form of land tenure than tenancy. In this
country, almost 80% of farmers farm on rented land,moreoverwith
extremely fragmented ownership, which is one of the main drivers
of such a high proportion of tenant-operated lands (Sklenicka et al.,
2014). In comparison with Western Europe, both sale prices and
lease prices of land in the Czech Republic are still relatively low
(Sklenicka et al., 2013). Tenancy contracts are usually of unlimited
duration, and they usually contain a 1- to 3-year notice period. This
time limit does not motivate tenants towards long-term invest-
ments. The uncertainty of lease contracts in the Czech Republic
currentlyderivesmainly fromthedynamically developing land sale
and rental markets, with sale prices and lease prices of farmland
growing by asmuch as tens of percent annually, in order to catch up
with the several times higher price levels inWestern Europe. Under
these conditions, owners are not willing to guarantee long-term
conditions of lease contracts. The diametrically different priorities
andgoals for owner-operated and tenant-operated landunder such
conditions are more than obvious.
4.2. Can agro-environmental instruments compensate the
differences between owners and tenants?
Not only countries with a signiﬁcant proportion of land farmed
by tenants should take measures to ensure the sustainability of
land use through long-term investment in soil conservation. There
are essentially two methods for governments in these countries
to address this matter immediately – by implementing legislative
measures ensuring sufﬁcient tenure security for land tenants, or
by introducing a system of subsidies determined by environmental
standards, addressing the farming subjects and therefore compen-
sating or minimizing the differences between tenants and owners.
Since the ﬁrstmethod – legislativemeasures –maymean an undue
restriction of owners’ rights, the second method – a system of sub-
sidies – is preferred, especially in countries with liberal market
economies. For example, the member states of the EU have imple-
mented awhole systemofmeasures on national and regional levels
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GAEC), offering new incentives for the adoption of soil conserva-
ion practices (Kutter et al., 2011).
The results of our study conﬁrm very high efﬁciency of the
AEC standards for two of the tested variables (wide-row crops
nd soil-improving crops), albeit the effect of the interaction for
oil-improving crops was marginally non-signiﬁcant. Both of these
easures are deﬁned on the national level within the GAEC stan-
ards. On slopes over 7◦, the exclusion of wide-row crops, or the
se of soil-improving crops, is required in order to qualify for the
irect payments. Our results clearly show that on slopes below 7◦,
here these measures are not strictly required by the GAEC stan-
ards, the approach of owners, as deﬁned by their application of
hese two measures, is far more responsible. On these blocks, own-
rs used wide-row crops 3.1 times less often than tenants, whereas
oil-improving crops were used 3.8 times more often by owners
han by tenants. These numbers reﬂect the level of motivation of
oth groups of farmers to use soil conservation measures, with-
ut the effect of environmentally determined subsidies. In contrast,
n slopes above 7◦, the differences in the use of wide-row crops
ere fully compensated, and for soil-improving crops the differ-
nces were also almost eliminated. The statistical signiﬁcance of
he interaction Farming:Angle, together with the highly conclu-
ive average values provide proof that implementation of the GAEC
rinciples on slopes above 7◦ brings positive results and practically
liminates the differences between farming owners and tenants.
he amount of direct subsidies at the time when the data was col-
ected for this study was c. 200 EURha−1, which represents on an
verageapproximately25%of the farmers’ incomeper1haof arable
and in the Czech Republic. The absolute amounts of subsidies per
ectare are the same in all regions of the country, but in less fertile
reas the subsidies logically represent a signiﬁcantlyhigherpropor-
ion of the farmers’ income than in more fertile areas. The farmers’
ecision to accept GAEC conditions and collect direct subsidies is
oluntary. Where the farmer does not meet the GAEC conditions in
erms of erosion control, the direct payments are reduced by up to
%. Our results show that although the threat of such a reduction
rovides sufﬁcient motivation for most farmers to comply with the
AEC conditions, for a small proportion of farmers this motivation
s insufﬁcient and they would appear to consider the proﬁt from
roduction to be more ﬁnancially attractive than the lost propor-
ion of the direct subsidies.
The results of our study indicate that the rules are deﬁned effec-
ively, and that the level of subsidies is sufﬁciently motivating for
hese two types of measures on blocks strongly endangered by
rosion on slopes above 7◦. However, scientiﬁc debate needs to
ontinue as to whether similar principles should also be imple-
ented on less endangered production blocks on slopes below 7◦.
t the present time, there is a marked dichotomy in the application
f erosion control measures, where tenants, as opposed to owners,
re not motivated to make a long-term investment in soil conser-
ation at the expense of short-term proﬁt. If these cases are not
egulated, there is a risk of ongoing soil degradation on more than
/3 of the arable land in the Czech Republic. It is also necessary
o revise the limits and conditions of GAEC cross compliance to
nclude new indicators, in order to support additional soil conser-
ation measures. This would not necessarily lead to an increased
roportion of land that is declared vulnerable. Rather, the zoning
hould be ﬁne-tuned to be more effective.
The remaining two measures (slope length of production block;
ontour farming) are not currently regulated by the Czech version
f GAEC. The results of our study in these two cases conﬁrmed
igniﬁcantly more responsible treatment of soil by owners than
y tenants, without a statistically signiﬁcant difference between
lopes below 7◦ and above 7◦. This is logical, since neither of these
easures is strictly required or regulated by the GAEC standards,
nd we therefore cannot presume a signiﬁcant difference in thelicy 47 (2015) 253–261 259
motivation towards responsible farming on slopes slightly (up to
7◦) and strongly (above 7◦) endangered by erosion.
Although farmers’ attitudes towards environmental policy
instruments are often ambiguous (Davies and Hodge, 2006;
Zeithaml et al., 2009), there is ongoing development and reﬁne-
ment of these instruments to include a wide complex of
environmental principles, reﬂecting the assessment of the effec-
tivity of these instruments in countries with varying political and
economic orientations. For example, Amdur et al. (2011) exam-
ined the possibilities of developing market-oriented instruments
of agri-environmental policy measures in Israel, and Zheng et al.
(2015) evaluated experience from the efforts to minimize negative
environmental impact of livestock production in China. Adequate
subsidies and additional services also stand behind the willing-
ness of Swedish landowners to facilitate ecosystem services by
establishing new wetlands to reduce nutrient transport to the sea
(Hansson et al., 2012). However, a well-adjusted system of subsi-
dies based on agri-environmental schemes can only function well
if it is based on adequate legal measures and on the ability to
enforce thesemeasures effectively (Prazan andDumbrovsky, 2011;
Dumbrovsky´ et al., 2014).
The variety of political, economic, and also cultural conditions
in individual countries and regionsmakes it impracticable to deﬁne
general principles for soil conservation. The mutual interactions of
restrictive and motivational measures need to be regularly eval-
uated, in order to keep ﬁne-tuning the conditions under which
soil conservation in a given country and region will be the most
efﬁcient.
5. Conclusions
Our study has used an analysis of the level of adoption of four
types of erosion control measures to answer two fundamental
questions: (1) Do land-owning farmers treat their own property
more responsibly than tenant farmers? (2) Do agri-environmental
instruments in support of sustainable farming practices pro-
vide sufﬁciently strong motivation to compensate the differences
between owners and tenants?
The results have proved that all measures were adopted by
owners in signiﬁcantly more responsible ways than by tenants.
Compared to the tenants, owners applied wide-row crops in crop
rotation Schemes 2.4 times less frequently in the last 5 years, while
applying soil-improving crops 1.9 times more frequently. Contour
farmingwas adopted 1.8 timesmore often by owners, and the slope
length in production blocks farmed by owners was on an average
2.4 times shorter than in blocks farmed by tenants.
Only two of the four tested types of measures, concerning the
use of wide-row crops and soil-improving crops, are supported
by subsidies based on the GAEC standards. Moreover, this scheme
applies only to arable blocks strongly endangered by erosion, on
slopes above 7◦. The results have shown that in these cases the
differences in the approach to soil conservation between owners
and tenants were minimized or eliminated, due to the adoption
of responsible practices by tenants. In the case of these two types
of measures, the results can therefore be interpreted as proof of
the efﬁciency of agri-environmental subsidy instruments, which
introduce signiﬁcant motivation for farmers to adopt soil conser-
vation measures. Moreover, this motivation is sufﬁciently strong
to eliminate the otherwise signiﬁcant differences between owner
and tenant farmers.
On a broader level, our study has discussed the role of land
tenure security in achieving sustainable land use, since the results
further demonstrate the need to ﬁne-tune the national conditions
for subsidy payments in the Czech Republic, mainly by extending
the scope of the existing instruments to blocks with low and
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edium risk of erosion. Similarly, it is necessary to revise the
imits and the conditions of GAEC cross compliance, and to include
ew indicators in these standards in order to support additional
oil conservation measures.
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